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James L. Huffman*

AMERICAN PRAIRIE RESERVE: PROTECTING
WILDLIFE HABITAT ON A GRAND SCALE
I. INTRODUCTION: SAVING A BIT OF THE GREAT AMERICAN
PRAIRIE
Since the European settlement of North America, humans have made
themselves an ever more dominant feature of what was once a sparsely populated
landscape. Today it is difficult to travel even a few miles in the United States
without seeing evidence of human settlement and industry. Nonetheless, there
remain a few places where the natural environment survives much as it was when
Native Americans were the continent’s only human occupants. One such place is
now the home of the American Prairie Reserve (APR), an ambitious effort to
preserve 3.5 million acres for buffalo to roam, along with dozens of other species,
on native prairie.1 Nowhere on earth do 3.5 million contiguous acres of
uncultivated prairie actually remain. However, along the Missouri River in
northeastern Montana there exist significant expanses of undisturbed prairie that
have been grazed by cattle and sheep for over a century but never put to the plow.
Interspersed, and far more common, are cultivated lands carved from the prairie by
late 19th and early 20th-century homesteaders. The Missouri River Breaks are
adjacent and have been protected since 1936 in the Charles M. Russell Wildlife
Refuge.2 The refuge surrounds Fort Peck Reservoir that extends over 125 miles of
the once free-flowing Missouri.3
In the most general terms, APR’s mission “is to create the largest nature
reserve in the continental United States, a refuge for people and wildlife preserved
forever as part of America’s heritage.”4 To achieve this mission, APR must acquire
title to hundreds of thousands of acres of private land while working closely with
the federal and state agencies that manage public lands within and adjacent to the
projected reserve. It is a daunting undertaking, not least because it is controversial
*

Dean Emeritus, Lewis & Clark Law School. BS, Montana State University (1967), MA, Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy (1969), JD, University of Chicago (1972). The author is grateful to Land
Manager Betty Holder and Managing Director Pete Geddes of American Prairie Reserve and the
participants in the PERC Workshop on Property in Ecology held at Case Western Reserve University
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1.The American Prairie Reserve, THE LONG RUN, http://www.thelongrun.org/american-prairie-reserve/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
2. Charles M. Russell National Wildlife Refuge: History of the Refuge, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV. (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.fws.gov/refuge/Charles_M_Russell/about/history.html.
3. Charles M. Russell National Wildlife Refuge: About the Refuge, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
(Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.fws.gov/refuge/Charles_M_Russell/about.html.
4. Our Mission & Values, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.org/mission-andvalues (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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among many of the people who live in this sparsely populated region of Montana.
Although APR is a private entity funded entirely by private donations, many
ranchers and local residents see it as a threat to their entrepreneurial and
independent way of life. “Don’t Buffalo Me – No Federal Land Grab” read large
protest signs posted near APR lands.5 Because a significant majority of the lands
within the intended Reserve are federal lands on which ranchers have grazed
livestock for most of a century, the local population tends to see the project as a
federal land grab rather than the result of the free market at work.6
Even if APR and its supporters were market purists who believed that any
governmental land ownership is a bad idea, they would have no choice but to work
with the federal government. The majority of the uncultivated prairie is in
government ownership because Montana’s 18th and early 19th century homesteaders
either passed it by in search of better land to farm or sold it back to the government
pursuant to the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937.7 In a real sense, these
are the lands that no one wanted, and thus they remained under the control of the
General Land Office and later came under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land
Management when that agency was created from a merger of the U.S. Grazing
Service and the General Land Office in 1946.8
The result is a patchwork of public and private lands with extensive
private use of public lands for grazing, first by custom on an open range, and later
under leases granted pursuant to the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act.9 All the while the
public lands remained habitat for wildlife to the extent they were able to compete
with livestock and evade hunters and predator control efforts. But for some species,
most notably bison, or buffalo as they have long been called in the American West,
the patchwork ownership with its accompanying fences is too confining for their
long-term success. Absent the buffalo, an essential element of the prairie ecology is
missing. Hence, central to APR’s mission is to assemble an area large enough to
sustain bison in as natural a condition as possible.10
APR’s core strategy of purchasing lands that have conservation and
wildlife habitat values is not new. The Nature Conservancy and other conservation
organizations have employed the approach for decades, but not on the scale
planned by APR, nor with the intent to retain ownership and manage the lands in
perpetuity. Nature Conservancy often avoids the significant costs of ongoing
maintenance and management by transferring title to the government. While APR

5. Ben Pierce, American Prairie Reserve: Conservation Project Finding Success, Fueling
Controversary in Northeast Montana, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (May 28, 2015), https://www.
bozemandailychronicle.com/outdoors/american-prairie-reserve-conservation-project-finding-successfueling-controversy-in/article_7099a013-fe92-5a18-9fbc-ac7fc9fe5354.html.
6. Id.
7. Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-210, 50 Stat. 522 (1937). Many
government maps show BLM managed lands in two colors distinguishing lands never claimed from
lands purchased by the government under the Bankhead-Jones Act.
8. The merger was part of a government reorganization under the Truman administration.
9. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315
(2012)).
10. BISON MANAGEMENT PLAN, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE 101 (2018), https://www.
americanprairie.org/sites/default/files/APR_BisonPlan_062018.pdf.
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intends for the Reserve to be open to the public, it retains title to the private lands it
acquires and assumes the cost of management and property taxes.11
APR is an important initiative in its own right. It has the potential to save
significant expanses of surviving prairie and to begin the long process of restoring
other lands that have been altered, in some cases by over a century of cultivation. It
also promises to reestablish a population of as many as 10,000 bison,12 a small
number in comparison to the tens of millions that once roamed the prairie,13 but
large enough to help restore a prairie ecology over three and a half million acres
once the Reserve reaches its intended size. Assuming APR is able to raise an
estimated 450 million dollars14 for purchases of private lands, the success of the
project turns on the control and management of between 1.75 and 2 million acres of
BLM grazing lands historically associated with those private lands. APR has the
fortuitous advantage of a central concern for providing grazing land for their
privately owned bison, which are classified as livestock under Montana law,15
compared to other environmental and conservation groups that promote their
objectives by acquiring and then retiring grazing permits.16 Nevertheless, the
American Prairie Reserve can serve as a useful case study of the potential role for
markets in the future use and management of the vast grasslands administered by
the BLM and the Forest Service.
II. AMERICA’S LARGEST LAND OWNER
The largest single owner of wildlife habitat in the United States is the
United States federal government. The 1970 Public Land Law Review Commission
exaggerated only a bit in titling its report One Third of the Nation’s Land.17 Today
the federal government owns 640 million acres, which is roughly 28% of the
nation’s 2.27 billion acres.18 Ninety-five percent of the federal lands, amounting to
610 million acres, are administered by four federal agencies: the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) in the Department of Interior and the Forest Service in the
Department of Agriculture.19 The vast majority of these lands provide habitat for
wildlife, either as a part of the agencies’ missions or by default.
11. Building the Reserve: FAQs, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.org/buildingthe-reserve-faqs (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
12. AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 10, at 7.
13. Bison Restoration, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.org/project/bisonrestoration (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
14. Interview with Pete Geddes, Managing Director, Am. Prairie Reserve, in Bozeman, Mont. (Jan.
3, 2018).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-1-101 (2011).
16. The National Wildlife Federation and Wildlife Guardians. See About, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N,
https://www.nwf.org/en/WCR/About (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also Grazing Permit Retirement,
WILDEARTH
GUARDIANS,
https://wildearthguardians.org/public-lands/greater-gila/grazing-permitretirement/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
17. PUB. LAND L. REV. COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS (1970).
18. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 6
(2017).
19. Id. at 1.
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The FWS manages 89 million acres, largely through the National Wildlife
Refuge System.20 These lands have been set aside, beginning in 1903 with the
creation of the Pelican Island National Wildlife Refuge,21 for the express purpose
of protecting and preserving wildlife habitat.22 The NPS manages almost 80 million
acres in 418 distinct units, the earliest created was Yellowstone National Park in
1872.23 While the individual national parks have varying purposes, most of the
larger ones contain significant wildlife habitat. The Forest Service controls about
193 million acres, most of which are designated as national forests managed
pursuant to a multiple-use mandate that includes wildlife habitat protection.24
Finally, the BLM administers 248 million acres also managed under a multiple-use
mandate from Congress that includes wildlife habitat protection.25
In addition to the wildlife-specific provisions of the various agencies’
authorizing legislation, several federal environmental laws impose wildlife habitat
protection responsibilities on the federal land management agencies, notably the
Migratory Bird Conservation Act,26 the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),27 the Endangered Species Act (ESA),28 and the Marine Mammals
Protection Act.29 NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental
impacts of all major federal actions.30 This means that the land management
agencies must assess the environmental impacts, including impacts on wildlife
habitat, of most of their land and resource management policies and actions.31 The
ESA requires all federal agencies, in consultation with the FWS and/or the
Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), to document, justify, and mitigate where feasible actions likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any FWS or NOAA listed species or result in
the destruction of adverse modification of FWS of NOAA designated critical
habitat of such species.32 The law also requires similar documentation, justification,
20. Id. at 5.
21. See Exec. Order No. 1014 (Jan. 26, 1909) (expanding the original unnumbered Executive Order
of March 13, 1903 creating the Pelican Island Reservation).
22. Id.
23. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 18, at 5; see also Yellowstone: History & Culture, U.S.
DEP’T INTERIOR NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/historyculture/index.htm (last
updated Mar. 29, 2018).
24. Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified at 16
U.S.C § 583 (2012)).
25. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified
at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)).
26. Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-770, 45 Stat. 1222 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 715 (2012)).
27. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
28. Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531
(1976)).
29. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified at 16
U.S.C §§ 1361-1362 (1976)).
30. See National Environmental Policy Act, COUNC. ON ENVTL. QUALITY, https://ceq.doe.gov/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2018).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
32. Endangered Species Act § 17, 16 U.S.C. § 1531.
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and mitigation where feasible for actions that cause a “taking”33 of any listed
species of endangered fish or wildlife.34
While the FWS mission is to preserve and protect wildlife habitat and the
NPS mission in most national parks includes wildlife habitat conservation, the
Forest Service and the BLM often face management choices that conflict with
wildlife protection and preservation goals.35 Both agencies function under multipleuse mandates that require compromise of wildlife management objectives.36 In a
very real sense, the multiple-use laws that govern the management of Forest
Service and BLM lands were Congress’ way of avoiding difficult policy choices by
delegating them to the agencies. In doing so, members of Congress may have
convinced themselves that the agencies would resolve contentious political issues
by resorting to science and expert resource managers, but the reality has been that
politics remains at the heart of public lands management. The public lands are, as
economist Richard Stroup observed many years ago, America’s political lands.37
The political nature of public lands management was brought to a stark
focus by the 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge
headquarters in southeastern Oregon.38 The occupation stemmed from long-running
disputes between the federal government and some western ranchers.39 In a
nutshell, the ranchers and their supporters have claimed that the BLM’s
management of the public lands, on which many western ranches depend for
livestock grazing, has favored wildlife habitat protection and other environmental
objectives in contravention of what the ranchers believe to be their long-settled
rights under the Taylor Grazing Act.40 It is not surprising that significant reductions
in lands available for grazing and in numbers of livestock permitted on those lands
over the last half-century have led ranchers to believe that their rights are being
whittled away. But it is fair to say that both the politics and the law are not
favorable to the ranchers’ claims.
What would be favorable to the interests of the ranchers is a reform of
federal land management laws that would allow markets to substitute for at least
some of the politics that now dominate the federal government’s management of its
vast grazing lands. While many ranchers feel threatened by the prospect of their
neighbors selling out to conservationists like APR, the reality has been that
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988) (defining “take” to mean “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
35. See James L. Huffman, Public Lands Management in an Age of Deregulation and Privatization,
10 PUB. LANDS & RESOURCES L. REV. 29, 48-49 (1989).
36. Id.
37. James L. Huffman, Managing America’s Public Lands: Proposals for the Future--Introductory
Remarks, 18 PUB. LANDS & RESOURCES L. REV. 143, 147 (1997).
38. Harrison Berry, Militia Group Seizes Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters, BOISE
WKLY. (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/militia-group-seizes-malheur-nationalwildlife-refuge-headquarters/Content?oid=3687251.
39. Id.
40. The recent occupation of the Malheur Wildlife Refuge based on the grazing rights claims of the
Bundys and others is illustrative. See SHAWN REGAN, MANAGING CONFLICTS OVER WESTERN RANGE
LANDS 18 (PERC Policy Series No. 54) (2016); see also Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012)).
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regulatory changes have reduced the economic value of grazing leases without any
compensation to the lessees.41 Making grazing leases transferable without the many
restrictions that currently exist would allow ranchers to recoup at least some of the
investment they have made in public grazing lands and in private lands and
improvements dependent on those public lands.42 It would also require
conservationists to put their money where their mouth is, as APR is doing, rather
than investing in lobbying and litigation to influence public lands policies. As
Shawn Regan puts it in Managing Conflicts over Western Rangelands,43 allowing
for grazing lands to be allocated through market transactions rather than
bureaucratic fiat would shift the landscape from “raiding to trading” – from
political competition and lawsuits to mutually beneficial, voluntary transactions.44
Rather than conflict between what environmentalists view as welfare ranchers and
what ranchers view as socialist environmentalists, conservationists like APR would
occupy the position of ranchers while pursuing environmental objectives and
ranchers would have incentives to collaborate on those environmental goals while
continuing to profit from their ranching enterprises.
III. THE EXISTING LAW OF THE PUBLIC LAND
The existing law of the federal public grazing lands emerged from a
century of largely unregulated grazing on the public domain lands that had not been
transferred to private owners or to state governments. In a sense, the lands had
come into federal ownership by default as the result of the nation’s expanding
sovereignty over formerly French, Spanish, British, Mexican, and Russian
territories occupied by relatively few private landowners. Congressional policy for
most of the 19th century was focused on disposal of federal lands via grants to
newly admitted states for the support of schools and universities, grants to railroad
companies to encourage railroad expansion, and grants to individuals for farming
and ranching. Until late in the century, there were very few people in or out of
government who imagined that the federal government would continue to own land
other than for basic governmental services.45

41. Bill Steven Stem, Permit Value: A Hidden Key to the Public Land Grazing Dispute 41 (Apr.
21, 1998) (M.S. thesis, University of Montana).
42. Id. at 53.
43. REGAN, supra note 40, at 8.
44. Id. at 26-27.
45. Debates over the appropriateness and/or constitutionality of federal retention of vast tracts of
western lands continue today as exemplified by recent armed conflicts in Oregon and Nevada. Those
defending extensive federal land ownership often reference statehood acts as support for their claim that
federal retention was contemplated as early as the Ohio statehood act of 1804. While statehood acts vary
one from another, most conditioned statehood on the new state disclaiming any interest in federal public
lands within its borders. But this condition reflected a federal desire to retain the proceeds from any
future sale of public lands, not a desire to retain title in perpetuity. Illustrative of this intent is a
condition of the Oregon statehood act in compliance with which the Oregon legislature declared that the
“State shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil within the same by the United States.”
See Andy Kerr, Statehood and Federal Public Lands: A Deal is a Deal, PUB. LANDS BLOG (Sept. 9,
2016), http://www.andykerr.net/kerr-public-lands-blog/2016/9/8/statehood-and-federal-public-lands-adeal-is-a-deal.
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Land grants to states and railroads were significant but made only a dent
in the vast public domain. It was generally assumed and expected that the
remainder of the lands would be transferred to private owners for largely
agricultural purposes.46 Indeed it was anticipated that the checkerboard pattern of
grants to railroads would entice private settlement of the intermediate lands.47 Even
before Congress took any formal action many people simply squatted on
unoccupied lands, something of a precedent for the unauthorized grazing that was
later common on the Western prairies. In the 1830s, Congress enacted preemption
laws granting title, with certain conditions, to lands occupied by squatters.48 Over
the following decades, Congress enacted several laws designed to encourage
settlement and homesteading by granting private title to public lands, again with
conditions requiring active development and limits intended to prevent
speculation.49
Millions of acres of federal land were transferred under these various
disposal programs, but millions more were still in the public domain when public
attitudes about federal land ownership began to change in the late 19th century.
Tens of millions of acres of land thought to have special public value, beginning
with Yellowstone Park in 1872 and soon to be followed by the Forest Reserve Act
of 1891, were withdrawn (reserved) from the public domain and thus no longer
available for private acquisition.50 Over the next several decades, other national
parks were created along with wildlife refuges and the vast majority of today’s 190
million acres of forest reserves.
Even then, over half of the federal government’s original land holdings
remained in the public domain and were thus available for livestock grazing.51 For
decades, homesteaders and other farmers and ranchers grazed their cattle and sheep
on the “open range” free of charge with predictable consequences.52 The public
domain constituted an open-access commons in which ranchers had no property
rights and thus no incentive to conserve and protect the grasslands. The result was
extensive over-grazing, erosion, and loss of habitat for wildlife. After several failed
efforts to control the abuse of public grasslands, Congress enacted the 1934 Taylor
Grazing Act “to stop injury to the public grazing lands by preventing overgrazing
and soil deterioration” and to “provide for their orderly use, improvement, and
46. See MARK FIEGE, THE REPUBLIC OF NATURE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 72-74 (2012); see also Daniel W. Bromley, Private Property and the Public Interest: Land in
the American Idea, in LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST: PRIVATE CLAIMS AND THE COMMON GOOD 25-28
(William G. Robbins and James C. Foster eds., 2000).
47. Merry J. Chavez, Public Access to Landlocked Public Lands, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377
(1987).
48. Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (repealed 1891).
49. See id.; see also Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976); Timber Culture Act of
1873, Pub. L. No. 42-277, 17 Stat. 605c (repealed 1891); Kinkaid Amendment of 1904, 33 Stat. 547
(repealed 1976); Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, Pub. L. No. 245 (repealed 1976); StockRaising Homestead Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 862 (repealed 1976).
50. Federal Reserve Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1095 (repealed 1976).
51. Unlawful Enclosures Act of 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (2012))
(banning fencing that prevented access to the public lands for grazing).
52. See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons
and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (1982) (discussing the consequences).
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development.”53 The U.S. Grazing Service was created to administer a system of
grazing districts, as well as to grant and charge for grazing permits to be issued to
qualifying ranchers.54 To qualify for a permit, ranchers had to meet two conditions,
the latter of which still today stands as a major obstacle to a market in the use of
these lands.55 The first condition was that permittees were required to have a recent
history of grazing on the open federal rangelands, a requirement reasonably meant
to respect established expectations.56 The second condition was that permittees
were required to have ownership of a nearby “base property.”57 The latter
requirement remains in place and thus precludes everyone except neighboring
ranchers from competing to purchase existing grazing leases unless they are also
willing and able to purchase the associated base property.58 A renewal preference
for the current permittee, even from nearby ranches that might qualify as base
property, further limits any prospect for a competitive market.59
A result of the public lands grazing regime established under the Taylor
Grazing Act is that the value, indeed the viability, of most ranches reliant on
federal lands for summer forage now depends on the security of the rancher’s
grazing leases. Leases are usually for a ten-year period with the aforementioned
renewal preference.60 Fees are set by statute at a minimum of $1.35 per animal unit
month (AUM) with annual increases limited to 25 percent.61 Since 1980 the federal
grazing fee has ranged from $1.35 to $2.31 per AUM.62 In 2016 the fee was
$2.11.63 The fee is set according to a statutory formula accounting for comparable
private grazing fees, the sale price of beef and the cost of livestock production.64
Environmentalists often refer to federal grazing lessees as “welfare ranchers”
because federal grazing fees are a small fraction of what ranchers pay to lease
private grazing lands. In 2015 when the federal fee was $1.69 the average private
fee per AUM was $22.60.65 The difference is stark, but the two numbers are not
53. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315
(2012)).
54. Id.
55. See REGAN, supra note 40, at 14.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See How Do I Get a Grazing Permit?, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/rangelandmanagement/grazing/permits.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
61. See Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified
at 43 U.S.C. § 1901 (1982)); see also Livestock Grazing on Public Lands, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR
BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/natural-resources/rangelands-and-grazing
/livestock-grazing (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
62. See Press Release, Wildlife News, Grazing Fee Drops in 2017, Further Undervaluing Public
Lands (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.thewildlifenews.com/2017/01/31/grazing-fee-drops-in-2017-furtherundervaluing-public-lands/.
63. See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Interior Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2016 Grazing Fee,
Surcharge Rates, and Penalty for Unauthorized Grazing Use to All Field Office Officials (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2016-050.
64. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1901 (1982)).
65. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 7 (2016).
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really comparable. Federal grazing lessees are responsible for maintenance costs
(e.g. fencing, water supply) that are generally borne by private lessors. In addition,
public grazing lands generally provide far less forage per acre requiring ranchers to
invest more in fencing and livestock monitoring than is necessary on higher quality
private lands. Whether a sixteen-fold difference actually makes the real costs of
public and private land grazing roughly the same is a question for economists, at
least some of whom conclude that the total costs of public land grazing might be
even higher than private land grazing.66
Whatever one concludes about the adequacy of the federal grazing fee,
there is no doubt that taxpayers are subsidizing the federal grazing program.67
Together the BLM and Forest Service administer 26,000 permits on 29,000
allotments covering 245 million acres.68 In 2014, combined federal appropriations
for the two agencies’ grazing programs totaled $143.6 million.69 During that same
year, grazing receipts for the two agencies totaled $18.5 million.70 If the federal
grazing lessees’ total costs are, in fact, similar to those paid by private grazing
lessees, and assuming private landowners do not lease grazing land at a loss, it is
puzzling why BLM and Forest Service leasing program costs are nearly 8 times
higher than their revenues. Obviously, it is possible to lease grazing land at a profit,
so either BLM and Forest Service lessees are paying drastically underpriced fees or
the government is even less efficient than the most cynical critics of government
could have imagined. If ranchers’ total costs are in fact comparable under public
and private grazing leases, it is safe to assume that a significant increase in federal
fees would drive ranchers to private leases where that is an option, or out of
business where the only grazing land available is public. In any event, it is clear
that taxpayers are spending far more to provide public land grazing than ranchers
are paying to use it.
At least part of the explanation for the high costs of administering the
grazing programs are the multiple-use responsibilities of both the BLM and Forest
Service. As a result of the enactment of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of
1960, the National Forest Lands are to be “administered for outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”71 A similar requirement
has governed the BLM since passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976.72 Whether or not Congress intended that every acre of the affected
66. Jes Burns & Tony Schick, Controversial Federal Grazing Fees Not a Great Deal For Anyone,
OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoffbundy-militia-news-updates/federal-grazing-fees/.
67. See generally Taxpayers for Common Sense, The Federal Grazing Program: A Stampede of
Taxpayer Holdouts, http://www.taxpayer.net/wp-content/uploads/ported/images/downloads/TheFederal
GrazingProgram_AStampedeofTaxpayerHandouts.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
68. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior Bureau of Land Mgmt., BLM and Forest Service
Announce 2017 Grazing Fee (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-and-forest-serviceannounce-2017-grazing-fee).
69. CHRISTINE GLASER ET AL., COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL PRICE OF LIVESTOCK
GRAZING ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS 17 (2015).
70. Id.
71. Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified at 16
U.S.C § 583 (2012)).
72. FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)).
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public lands be administered for multiple-use purposes or that the agencies could
effectively zone and supply multiple-uses in the aggregate has never been clear. It
is reasonable to assume that, from the perspective of users of the public lands and
advocates for particular uses, the multiple-use mandate invites challenges to any
management decisions that appear to favor one use over another. A result of the
“raid or trade” formulation has been a proliferation of single-interest groups
advocating for their favored use. As described by political scientists R. McGregor
Cawley and John Freemuth, multiple-use has created a zero-sum political game that
“encourages the various participants to concentrate their energies on the task of
blocking the moves of their opponents rather than on seeking to establish a
common ground upon which compromises could be constructed.”73 A history of
decline in the number of AUMs permitted on the public lands gives ranchers every
reason to see the political game as Cawley and Freemuth describe it.74 Today,
AUMs permitted on BLM lands are half what they were in 1954.75 Reduction of
over-grazing probably accounts for some of that decline, but much has been the
result of politically driven shifts to competing uses.
It is obvious that not every acre can be managed for all of the prescribed
multiple-uses – a campground cannot also accommodate cows. It is also obvious
that the location of a campground cannot be determined without considering the
impact on grazing and other potential uses. Because grazing, if regulated, is
compatible with many other uses, management choices are not clear-cut and thus
invite the political competition described by Cawley and Freemuth.76 The 1976
Public Rangeland Improvement Act tips the balance in favor of the anti-grazing
and pro other-interest groups, but even then, grazing administration requires
consideration of the impact of grazing on the other multiple-uses.77 Assuming these
costs are included in the BLM and Forest Service grazing program budgets, it is not
surprising that the costs of leasing are much higher for public grazing lands than for
private grazing lands.
Although possession of a permit to graze on a particular public land
allotment is essential to the economic viability of many ranches and is a significant
factor in the market value of those ranches, it is not a property right.78 Lessees hold
a “grazing privilege” that the government can decline to renew without any liability
to the lessee.79 In the 1973 case United States v. Fuller, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the federal government is not required by the Fifth Amendment to
compensate a property owner in a condemnation action for the extra value of his
property attributed to his federal grazing permit.80 In 2000, a unanimous Supreme

73. R. M. CAWLEY & J. FREEMUTH, A CRITIQUE OF THE MULTIPLE-USE FRAMEWORK IN PUBLIC
LANDS DECISION MAKING 35-36 (1997).
74. Id.
75. See REGAN, supra note 40, at 5.
76. CRAWLEY & FREEMUTH, supra note 73.
77. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1901 (1982)).
78. David K. Lambert & J.S. Shonkwiler, Property Rights, Grazing Permits, and Rancher Welfare,
20(1) J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 146, 147 (1995).
79. Id.
80. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973).
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Court held that the Secretary of Interior “has always had the statutory authority . . .
to reclassify and withdraw range land from grazing use.”81 Despite this clear
understanding that public land grazing lessees do not have property rights in their
grazing leases, ranchers have been able to rely on the renewal of those leases,
although not necessarily for the same level of usage, as the decline in total AUMs
since 1954 underscores. Thus, purchasers of base properties with associated
grazing allotments, and lenders who finance such purchasers, bear the not
insignificant risk of a change in government policy.
Another factor affecting the security of federal grazing leases is a ‘use it
or lose it’ requirement. BLM regulations make lessees subject to civil penalties for
“failing to make substantial grazing use as authorized by a permit or lease for 2
consecutive years.”82 The regulations further allow BLM to issue nonrenewable
grazing permits to other qualified applicants “[[i]f forage available for livestock is
not or will not be used by the preference permittee or lessee.”83 It is possible for
grazing allotments or portions of allotments to be rested for purposes of range
improvement or restoration, but only with the approval of the BLM.84 Thus range
management rests largely with the BLM, and grazing lessees are at risk of
temporarily or permanently losing their grazing privileges at the discretion of BLM
officials.85

IV. THE AMERICAN PRAIRIE RESERVE
Federal public lands subject to the foregoing laws and regulations form a
significant part of the prairie ecosystems of the Northern Great Plains. In 1999, The
Nature Conservancy (TNC) published an in-depth report identifying landscapes in
the Northern Great Plains critical “to maintain the long-term viability of all native
plant and animal species and examples of all natural communities across their
natural ranges of occurrence and variation within the ecoregion.”86 The Northern
Great Plains Steppe ecoregion encompasses 250,000 square miles including parts
of five American states (Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming) and two Canadian provinces (Alberta and Saskatchewan).87 Across the
region, approximately 60% of the natural vegetation remains intact providing
habitat for “42 primary species, 18 secondary species, 323 natural communities,
and two general aquatic communities.”88 The study prioritized landscapes on the

81. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 741 (2000).
82. Acts Prohibited on Public Lands, 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(2) (2006). Lessees can get approval for up
to 3 years of non-use under 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g) (2006); see also Transforming the Department of the
Interior for the 21st Century: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 117th Cong. 14-15 (2017)
(statement of Shawn Regan, PERC Research Fellow).
83. Range Improvement Permits, 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-3(c) (2006).
84. Id.
85. In practice, loss of grazing privileges is rare and generally only where the lessee has failed to
comply with the terms of his or her lease.
86. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, ECOREGIONAL PLANNING IN THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS
STEPPE viii (1999).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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basis of several factors related to prospects for achieving the conservation goals.89
As one would expect, larger undisturbed landscapes were identified as the highest
priority and, not surprisingly, those areas were largely in federal ownership under
BLM and Forest Service management.90 But because of the many interspersed
private properties within the highest priority areas, The Nature Conservancy study
concluded that “[i]t is critical that conservation action within these sites employ
both private and public land strategies.”91
Among the highest priority sites identified by TNC is the Montana
Glaciated Plains, a region constituting 2,545,985 acres north of the Charles M.
Russell National Wildlife Refuge on the Missouri River in northeastern Montana.92
Just over half of the region is managed by the BLM (43.4%) and the Forest Service
(12.1%), with most of the remainder in private and some state ownership.93
Although TNC has a long history of acquiring private lands for conservation and
working with public agencies in the management of those lands, the scale of a
conservation effort over the entirety of the Montana Glaciated Plains is beyond the
means of an organization with a national and global conservation mission. In the
wake of the Nature Conservancy study, the World Wildlife Fund decided to initiate
a conservation effort in the Northern Great Plains and concluded that only an
independent, focused conservation effort could succeed in the preservation of the
region identified in the study.94 In 2001 the American Prairie Foundation, now
doing business as American Prairie Reserve, was formed as an independent, nonprofit organization with the mission “to create the largest nature reserve in the
continental United States, a refuge for people and wildlife preserved forever as part
of America’s heritage.”95
APR has the very ambitious goal of assembling 2.5 million acres of
private and leased public lands that when combined with the 1 million acres of the
Charles M. Russell Wildlife Refuge will constitute a 3.5 million acre reserve.96 By
comparison, Yellowstone National Park covers 2.2 million acres.97 “Our main
focus,” declares the APR website, “is to purchase and permanently hold title to
private lands that glue together a vast mosaic of existing public lands so that the
region is managed thoughtfully and collaboratively with state and federal agencies
for wildlife conservation and public access.”98 To achieve its 3.5 million acre goal,

89. Id.
90. Id. at 51.
91. Id. at 41.
92. Id. at 42.
93. Id.
94. Partnering for America’s Plains, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, Summer 2016, https://www.
worldwildlife.org/magazine/issues/summer-2016/articles/partnering-for-america-s-plains; see also Our
Story, AM. PRAIRIE RES., https://www.americanprairie.org/our-story (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
95. AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 4; see Pete Geddes, The Yellowstone of the Future, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/opinion/the-yellowstone-of-thefuture.html.
96. AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 11.
97. Park Facts, NAT’L PARK SERV. (May 31, 2018), https://www.nps.gov/yell/planyourvisit/park
facts.htm.
98. AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 4.
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APR will need to acquire about 500,000 acres of private land.99 As of October
2017, APR has acquired 91,588 deeded acres with leases on 272,717 acres of BLM
lands and 34,674 of state trust lands at a total cost of close to 60 million dollars.100
APR estimates that the remaining acquisitions of private lands will cost in the
neighborhood of another 450 million dollars.101
However, acquisition costs are only part of the financial challenge facing
APR. Unlike TNC and some other organizations that have chosen land purchase
over lobbying and litigation as a conservation strategy, APR intends, as noted
above, to retain ownership in perpetuity rather than avoid long-term management
and maintenance costs by conveying title to the government. In 2017, Reserve
operating costs, not including fund-raising and debt service, were about $2.4
million102 While operating and maintenance costs will continue in perpetuity, it is
not expected that they will rise significantly as more lands are acquired. This is
because the costs of removing fences and other farm improvements are one-time
expenses. Perhaps the best basis for projecting APR’s ongoing operating costs is
the comparable costs on the CRM that in FY 2017 total $2.16 million for
management of 1 million acres.103 Assuming no economies attributable to private
efficiencies, or governmental inefficiencies, that translates to $1.6 million annual
operating costs on APR’s projected 750,000 private acres, plus whatever
management costs APR bears on BLM leased lands and the property taxes it
pays.104 Perhaps the current $2.4 million budget is reasonable for the long-term
(adjusted for inflation, of course).
APR has little prospect for earned revenue beyond camping and lodging
fees, APR swag, auctioned permits to hunt buffalo on the Reserve, projected at
$550 for members and $650 for non-members, and a fledgling membership
program.105 Because much of the Reserve will be on public lands, and because
maintaining good public relations with a skeptical local population is a challenge,
APR has included public access in its mission.106 Thus they have no plans to charge
visitors’ fees.107 But even if they did impose an entrance charge, their isolated

99. AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 11.
100. Id.
101. Geddes, supra note 14.
102. AMATICS CPA GROUP, AUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2017),
https://www.americanprairie.org/sites/default/files/2017%20Audited%20Financial%20Statements%20%20Final.pdf.
103. A caveat on reliance on CMR costs is that, in the words of CMR manager Paul Santavy, “we
are in a pretty steep human capital reduction phase.” According to Santavy, CRM has experienced a
40% FTE reduction since 2010 and is scheduled to lose “the Deputy Project Leader, 2 refuge
management specialists, and 1 natural resource specialist” pursuant to an FWS regional workforce
realignment plan. That would mean reductions from a current staff of only 14, so the comparison may,
in fact, underestimate the costs of a well-managed APR. See E-mail from Paul Santavy, CMR manager,
to Pete Geddes, APR Managing Dir. (Jan. 4, 2018) (on file with author).
104. APR paid $91,560 in property taxes in 2017. Geddes, supra note 14.
105. See generally American Prairie Reserve, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.
americanprairie.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
106. See generally AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 4.
107. See Public Access FAQs, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.org/publicaccess-faqs (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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location assures that visitor fees will never yield significant revenues. Further, free
access means that the membership program will depend on people committed to the
APR mission rather than those looking for free or discounted admission to the
Reserve or hunting privileges. Thus, APR faces an ongoing fund-raising challenge
even after all the targeted lands are acquired. Although operating costs are not
expected to rise in proportion to future land acquisitions, each acquisition will add
to the property taxes APR pays on all of its private holdings, especially to
economically struggling counties starved for revenue.
Going forward APR plans to rely on concessionaires for management of
revenue generating initiatives on the theory that APR’s expertise is in land
acquisition and wildlife management, not recreation and tourism.108 Even with that
they expect earned revenues to provide a small part of future operating costs.109 To
meet the challenge of funding ongoing costs, APR has a target of raising a $125
million endowment.110 At a spending rate of 4%, once thought to be conservative
but today probably realistic, if not optimistic, an endowment of that amount would
generate $5 million each year – clearly enough unless costs are far higher than
expected. Because the focus here-to-fore has been on land acquisitions as
opportunities arise, APR’s present endowment is only $1.3 million and is not likely
to increase significantly in the near term given that they continue to have more land
acquisition opportunities than they have been able to afford. 111
The advantages of acquiring and retaining private ownership of Reserve
lands are significant. Subject to any applicable federal, state, or local regulations,
APR is free to manage its lands as it chooses and without the process and litigation
delays common to public lands management. On its private lands, APR is also free
from the multiple-use mandates that govern BLM and Forest Service grasslands.
“We are,” notes APR, “ . . . free to focus our land management decisions
exclusively on benefiting wildlife and the public’s enjoyment of it.”112 In an
expression of high confidence in its future fund-raising, the APR website also
asserts an advantage over governments that “[f]rom time-to-time . . . struggle to
fully fund large-scale parks and recreation areas, sometimes even needing to close
them temporarily due to insufficient operational funds.”113
These clear advantages do not alter the reality that the success of APR is
heavily dependent on the cooperation of a wide array of governments with different
missions. Between APR’s westernmost properties near the confluence of the Judith
and Missouri Rivers and its easternmost properties midway on the north side of
Fort Peck Reservoir, BLM and FWS lands are variously designated for multipleuses, wild and scenic river, wilderness, national monument and wildlife refuge.
Fort Peck Reservoir, which runs through the Charles M. Russell National Wildlife

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Geddes, supra note 14.
Id.
See Pierce, supra note 5.
Geddes, supra note 14.
AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 11.
Id.
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Refuge, is managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.114 The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks share
wildlife management responsibilities. The Montana Department of State Lands has
responsibility for state lands located within the Reserve.115 Three Indian
reservations are located near the Reserve, one of which is Fort Belknap that has its
own bison herd, which has led to constructive collaboration with APR.116 The
Reserve occupies land in six counties that are home to many local residents who
see their way of life threatened by the Reserve.117
Notwithstanding these seemingly daunting challenges, APR has had
remarkable success in its first dozen years of land acquisition. Although many local
residents conflate APR with big government takeover of lands on which rural
economies depend, those who choose to sell benefit from the presence of a new
potential purchaser in an otherwise uncompetitive market. APR has been outbid on
a couple of its offers, but generally, there are few potential buyers unless a
neighboring ranch owner wishes to expand operations, usually to accommodate a
son or daughter who wants to be in the ranching business. There are far more
landowners whose children have left for greener pastures and for whom their land
is their retirement fund. Among a rural population that often feels victim to
regulation and government indifference, the fact that APR pays market value to
willing sellers is, at least, the American way – even if it brings unwelcome change.
On the ground, APR’s achievements are many. Although they are quick to
insist that they are not only, or even primarily, about bison, they have built a
healthy and cattle gene-free herd of nearly a thousand animals.118 In establishing its
bison herd, APR has imported bison from other regions in the interest of avoiding
inbreeding, but the options are limited in light of their desire to maintain a
genetically pure herd. Because bison are fecund and conditions on the Reserve
have been favorable, additional land acquisitions are required or the herd will need
to be culled.119 But even when the Reserve reaches its full 3.5 million acres, its
projected capacity of 10,000 bison will eventually be exceeded.120 It is a problem
APR will no doubt welcome, although it will come with public relations challenges
since auctioning hunting permits is a likely solution along with the transfer of bison
to other reserves.
As large, heavy-grazing mammals, bison are important to the prairie
ecosystem that supports a wide range of other animal and plant species, including
prairie dogs, rattlesnakes, antelope and a wide array of raptors.121 Bison are also

114. See generally Fort Peck Lake Reservoir and Recreation Area, VISIT MONT., https://
www.visitmt.com/listings/general/lake/fort-peck-lake-reservoir-and-recreation-area.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2018).
115. Trust Lands Management, MONT. OFFICIAL ST. WEBSITE, http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/trust
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
116. See AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, BISON REPORT 2016-2017 4 (2018), https://www.americanprairie
.org/sites/default/files/APR_Bison%20Report_16_17.pdf.
117. Pierce, supra note 5.
118. See AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 116, at 2.
119. AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 10.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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important, as luck would have it, to the success of APR’s core strategy. Under
Montana law, APR’s bison are classified as livestock, not wildlife.122 This reflects
a long history of efforts to crossbreed bison and cattle in hopes of combining the
meat production of cattle with the winter hardiness of the bison. Whatever the logic
of the classification today, it has made it possible for APR to acquire and retain
public land grazing leases without a change in BLM rules, although APR must get
BLM approval, which in turn requires NEPA review. APR can substitute bison for
cattle on the BLM and Forest Service allotments. If APR sought to do the same
with deer, elk or antelope, they would come afoul of the use-it-or-lose-it rules
because wildlife do not count as grazers.123
In addition to its core wildlife habitat objectives, APR provides numerous
other public benefits. They have established campgrounds and are in the process of
developing a hut-to-hut system for hikers.124 For those more interested in high-end
glamping (glamorous camping), APR has luxurious yurts with a prairie vista
unequaled anywhere. APR’s deeded lands are also open to big game and bird
hunting without an access fee.125 They have an education and science center that
can accommodate resident scientists and visiting school groups, and they employ
their own staff of wildlife management professionals.126
APR is governed by a board consisting, in the words of APR Managing
Director Pete Geddes, of people “from across the political spectrum.”127 What
board members have in common, according to Geddes, is a passion for preserving a
threatened ecosystem and a high tolerance for risk.128 The latter, Geddes suggests,
is the key to APR’s early success. “Rather than sit back and wait until they have
raised enough money to accomplish a lot of their objective, they just jump at
opportunities that come along.”129 There is also agreement “across the board” on
long-term retention of acquired lands which raises the question of whether
investors and the public can expect APR to stay the course on its mission and
methods. Board turnover is inevitable and new members might be more risk-averse
122. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-1-101 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-101(6) (2009). Under
Montana law bison are classified as “domestic” if privately owned and “game animal” if wild. Under
this definition, the only wild buffalo in the state are those that roam into the state from Yellowstone
National Park. The National Bison Legacy Act of 2016 designates the American bison as the official
mammal of the United States, a status that has no apparent relevance to the states’ varying classification
of their resident bison.
123. See Authority and Definitions, 36 C.F.R. § 222.1(b)(8) (1979) (defining livestock at animals
kept or used for pleasure); see also 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(2) (2006) (held invalid in Western Watersheds
Projects v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 480 (2011)). Lessees can get approval for up to 3 years of nonuse under 43 CFR § 4130.2(g) (2006) (held invalid in Western Watersheds Projects v. Kraayenbrink,
632 F.3d 472, 480 (2011)).
124. Hut-to-Hut System, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.org/project/hut-to-hutsystem (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
125. See AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, supra note 107; see also Hunting, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE,
https://www.americanprairie.org/hunting (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
126. Enrico Education and Science Center, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.
org/enrico-center (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); Staff, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.american
prairie.org/profiles/staff (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
127. Geddes, supra note 14.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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and less committed to the long-term retention of the lands. The possibility of
selling or gifting the lands to the government as a means of freeing up resources for
other purchases and reducing operating costs will be a recurrent temptation.
There can be no ironclad assurance that future APR boards will rigidly
adhere to the mission and strategies of the founders, though in light of the steadily
diminishing economic opportunities in the region it is hard to imagine significant
diversion from the core mission of preserving the prairie for wildlife habitat and
future generations. According to Geddes, APR’s baseline – the prairie conditions
they seek to preserve – is 1804 (the first year of the Lewis & Clark expedition).
Presumably, that could change, although it makes sense in light of APR’s
acceptance of humans as part of the natural environment. The native tribes had
important influences on the prairie ecosystem, as do neighboring ranchers and
visitors to the Reserve.
Today’s supporters of the Reserve will naturally wish that the APR they
have helped to create will be the APR of the future and it probably will be, at least
in its primary mission. It was the prospect of future adaptation to improved
understanding of prairie ecosystems and to changing political and economic
circumstances as a feature of the private model that may well have attracted APR’s
early investors. It is the reality of decades-old public lands laws and land managers
constrained by mandates from regional and national officials that makes APR an
exciting and promising alternative. To be sure, the APR model requires ongoing
collaboration with government land management agencies, but most of the resource
managers within those agencies will have every incentive to make the collaboration
work if the prairie and wildlife prosper. Thus far, according to Geddes, government
land managers have welcomed APR as a friendly neighbor with a shared mission of
protecting wildlife, in contrast to the conflicts over wildlife the agencies often
experience with other private landowners.130
V. A MODEL FOR COLLABORATIVE PRIVATE-PUBLIC LAND
MANAGEMENT
The idea of allowing conservation and environmental interests to acquire
and retire federal public land grazing permits is not new, but the law and
regulations have been slow to change. Some of the resistance is inherent in
government. The federal bureaucracy is invested in the systems it has in place and
is hesitant to embrace disruptive change. However, the resistance is more about
public lands politics as it has evolved over the last century. For decades, resource
users such as timber, mining and ranching have had the upper hand. Conservation
was an important part of public lands policy, but conservation was for the purpose
of sustained yield, not preservation.131 Gifford Pinchot,132 not John Muir, was the
guiding light. With the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act and the succeeding

130. Id.
131. See JOHN B. LOOMIS, INTEGRATED PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS TO NATIONAL FORESTS, PARKS, WILDLIFE REFUGES, AND BLM LANDS 28 (2002).
132. Pinchot’s philosophy was that management principles should be guided by providing the
greatest good for the greater number for the long run. See History & Culture, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/giffordpinchot/learning/history-culture (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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public lands management legislation, the Muir philosophy began to gain the upper
hand. Public lands resources available for consumptive uses slowly declined as
environmentalists gained political clout. Though outnumbered by the largely urban
environmental interests, resource users fought a rear-guard action with remarkable
success. Environmentalist objectives were achieved less by changing the
underlying laws allowing for resource use than by superimposing process oriented
mandates like FLPMA and NEPA. Ranchers with public land grazing privileges
saw overall grazing allotments decline, but they managed to preserve their
exclusive hold on whatever grazing was allowed.
More than 10 percent of the land area of the United States, approximately
245 million acres, is owned by the federal government and managed for livestock
grazing by the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service.133 The
continuing existence of these mostly undeveloped lands is largely fortuitous. Even
after a century of affirmative federal land disposal policies, the lands remained in
public ownership when public attitudes shifted in the direction of public land
retention and management. Since 1960, in the case of the Forest Service, and 1976,
in the case of the BLM, these lands have been managed for multiple-uses,
including wildlife.134 But there remain significant, unexploited opportunities for
wildlife habitat preservation and protection on these public lands. The experience
of the American Prairie Reserve provides useful lessons for how the public grazing
lands can better serve wildlife habitat protection on a large scale.
While APR’s focus on bison as a key species in prairie preservation and
restoration has allowed the organization to achieve many of its goals within
existing government leasing regulations, the ambitious project also underscores
how a few regulatory and institutional changes could facilitate further significant
restoration and protection of wildlife habitat.
The first change is the elimination of the livestock grazing requirement. It
is not surprising that there is an expectation that lands leased for grazing will be
used for grazing. Early on, America’s long-standing policy of public land and
resource disposal to private parties reflected a strong bias against speculation.135
Private acquisition and nonuse of land and resources were thought to run counter to
the objective of promoting westward expansion and development. Whatever the
merits of anti-speculation laws in terms of economic theory, the idea that public
land grazing lessees must have grazing livestock on their allotments or lose their
permit to others has long been a central aspect of the federal grazing programs.136
While defenders of the use-it-or-lose-it rules contend that regular grazing is
necessary to the health of grasslands, APR has demonstrated that grassland health
can be served by the presence of large numbers of bison. The grazing patterns of

133. Livestock Grazing on Public Lands, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR BUREAU LAND MGMT.,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/natural-resources/rangelands-and-grazing/livestock-grazing (last visited
Dec. 1, 2018); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GRAZING STATISTICAL SUMMARY: FY 2016 (2017),
https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/documents/grazingstats/2010s/GrazingStatisticalSummaryFY2016.pdf.
134. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528, 531 (1960); see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1960); 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988).
135. See Robert B. Kieter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in
Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1131-32 (2005).
136. See 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(2) (2006).
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deer, elk and antelope are different from bison, but it is the case that the native
prairies evolved with and without bison present at all times in all areas.
Another change is the elimination of the base property requirement. Both
the Forest Service and the BLM require that a grazing lessee own base property in
the vicinity of the grazing allotment.137 Generally, base property means land,
although the BLM will consider water rights as base property in the desert
Southwest.138 The base property requirement appears to assume that a lessee cannot
have a successful livestock operation without private land which functions as
ranching headquarters. However, the fact that BLM allows water rights to count as
base property in the desert139 belies that a ranching headquarters is necessary.
Indeed a water rights requirement, particularly in the desert Southwest, is far more
likely than a land rights requirement to relate to the success of a livestock operation
that relies on public grazing lands. In any event, the base property requirement
makes little, if any, sense once grazing rights are made available to the highest
bidder without regard to whether or not there is a plan to put livestock on the land.
Because APR seeks to create a reserve of 3.5 million acres over which bison and
other wildlife can freely roam, the acquisition of existing base properties avoids
having to deal with un-cooperative private in-holders in the future. But recognizing
that not all ranchers within the Reserve boundaries will be interested in selling,
APR has developed a program designed to encourage private ranchers to
accommodate wildlife and in return, they get the benefit of a premium grass-fed
beef marketing program called Wild Sky Beef.140
Greater management autonomy for grazing lessees is another contributing
change. Under existing BLM and Forest Service regulations, grazing lessees must
get approval from government officials for many range management initiatives.141
Over eight decades since enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act, ranchers and
government bureaucrats have developed generally collaborative relationships that
impose minimal constraints on ranchers, except when livestock numbers and
particular lands have been limited for environmental reasons. Conservationists like
APR have different objectives and often-greater expertise relative to those
objectives, making many existing government regulations both burdensome and
counter-productive. For example, APR must get BLM approval for the removal of
fencing that is essential to cattle operations but an obstacle to free-roaming
bison.142 They must also get approval for year-round grazing which is appropriate

137. 36 C.F.R. § 222.3 (1981); 43 C.F.R. §4110.1(a) (2006) (held invalid in Western Watersheds
Projects v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 480 (2011)).
138. See 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-1(a) (2006) (held invalid in Western Watersheds Projects v.
Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 480 (2011)) (referencing water to qualify as base property); see also
Grazing Administration Requirements and Processes, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://
www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/documents/grazing/BLMGrazingAdministrationRequirements
Processes201708.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
139. Id.
140. See generally About, WILD SKY BEEF, http://wildskybeef.org/about (last visited Dec. 1, 2018);
Wild Sky Beef, AM. PRAIRIE RESERVE, https://www.americanprairie.org/wild-sky-beef (last visited Dec.
1, 2018).
141. 43 C.F.R. § 4120.3-39 (2006); 36 C.F.R. § 222.9 (2017).
142. See 43 C.F.R. 4120.3-3 (2006).
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for bison but has been considered inappropriate for cattle.143 While the BLM is
presumably required by NEPA to review the environmental impacts of fence
removal and year-round grazing, and APR has learned to work closely with BLM
on all management actions requiring BLM approval, the government oversight
does impose costs on APR which depletes resources that otherwise could be
devoted directly to the conservation mission. If and when grazing lands become
more available for conservation purposes, it will be important for the BLM and
Forest Service to eliminate regulations and procedures intended to serve grazing
management objectives.
Additionally, consolidation of public lands is a change that APR
demonstrates could facilitate restoration and wildlife protection. Ever since federal
land policy shifted from disposal to retention and management, both public and
private land managers have struggled with the checkerboard pattern of public and
private ownership that resulted largely from the policy of granting to railroad
companies title to every other section within as much as 40 miles of the railroad
right-of-way.144 Although the federal government has long sought to facilitate
public land management by consolidating public ownership through public-private
land exchanges, the checkerboard pattern persists in most of the West.145 In a sense,
APR is in the business of consolidating land ownership by purchasing private lands
and working closely with government on leased and other public lands. But for the
same reason that the federal government has sought to consolidate ownership,
conservation organizations able and willing to lease federal grazing lands for
wildlife habitat will benefit from land ownership patterns that provide more
expansive landscapes.
Another beneficial change would be market rate leasing. Because
Americans generally view conservation and environmental protection as public
benefits and private economic enterprise as providing purely private benefits, many
environmentalists will contend that the use of public lands for conservation and
wildlife habitat should not come at a cost to conservation advocates.146 A common
refrain is that the public owns these lands and should not have to pay to use them.
Putting aside the many public benefits from private enterprise, the history of public
lands management, since the disposal era, has been one of competing claims on the
public interest, leading to the politics of “raiding” as described by Shawn Regan.147
As Regan contends, trading through markets both reduces transactions costs (the
transactions costs of politics are too often ignored) and provides a better measure of
143. There are studies finding that moderate, year-round cattle grazing can also be beneficial to the
range, although cattle are more inclined to congregate in riparian areas during both hot and cold periods
resulting in damage to both streams and grasslands. For a review of peer-reviewed literature on the
question. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CONSERVATION BENEFITS OF RANGELAND PRACTICES:
ASSESSMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND KNOWLEDGE GAPS (David D. Briske ed., 2011).
144. Roger D. Billings, The Homestead Act, Pacific Railroad Act and Morrill Act, 39 N. KY. L. REV.
699, 706 (2012).
145. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41509, LAND EXCHANGES: BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
(BLM) PROCESS AND ISSUES 4 (2016).
146. See, e.g., Statement on User Fees of Public Lands, SIERRA CLUB (Nov. 4, 2004), https://www.
sierraclub.org/policy/user-fees-public-lands.
147. Shawn Regan, Raiding and Trading in the American West, AM. CONSERVATIVE (May 23,
2014), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/raiding-and-trading-in-the-american-west/.
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the relative values of alternative uses.148 Thus, it is important that non-grazing users
of public grasslands pay market value for their leases. Under current law, market
value is determined through an administrative process.149 Market value would be
better determined through a competitive bidding process in which potential
conservation lessees compete with ranchers and other conservation groups to
establish the most valued use of the land.
Long-term leases are a change that APR is showing could be effective.
BLM grazing leases are generally for a ten-year period with a renewal preference
to the existing permittee. While ranchers have been able to rely on regular renewal
and continued access to public lands, they have experienced reductions in numbers
of livestock allowed and are not guaranteed lease renewal. This means that any
permittee, including APR, can have its lease canceled or the lease conditions
altered at the discretion of the BLM. Clearly, APR is confident that their significant
investments in base properties will not be undercut by a change in government
policy; however, in the politics of competing claims on the public lands, anything
is possible. It would be far better for BLM and the Forest Service to grant longerterm leases, particularly to entities like APR whose objective of prairie restoration
will not be achieved for decades. There is a legitimate argument that public
resources should not be alienated in perpetuity, but grants of as many as fifty years
have proven, in the case of hydropower licensing, to be an effective way of
assuring that future generations will have the option of following a different
path.150
One of the biggest changes APR has demonstrated as effective is publicprivate collaboration. Essential to the success of any private conservation effort
involving the use of public lands, whether federal or state, are good relations
between the government and the private enterprise. Agreement on objectives, or at
least government acceptance of the private objectives, and an established process
for ongoing collaboration are critical to the success of the private effort. A record
of successful collaboration will also encourage other private conservation groups to
seek similar opportunities on public lands. As in purely private collaborations, it is
always better to have clearly defined rights and responsibilities, but for now, the
reality is likely to be one in which government has the authority to take actions
contrary to the expectations and interests of the private conservation program.
Therefore, private conservationists should make every effort to work with
government officials, as APR has done, while also working to increase the security
of their rights under the leases they negotiate.
User fees are a factor that could influence the success of private
conservation efforts on public lands, providing potential revenues to offset
acquisition and management costs. Fee hunting, which is the practice of private
landowners charging an access fee to hunters licensed by the state, is controversial
in Montana. Although it is clear that private landowners can exclude hunters and
fisherman from their property, limiting access to those willing and able to pay a
148. Id.
149. See Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified
at 43 U.S.C. § 1901, 1905 (1982)); Exec. Order No. 12, 548, 51 Fed. Reg. 5985 (Feb. 19, 1986).
150. See HYDROPOWER LICENSING – GET INVOLVED, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N 4
(2016), https://www.ferc.gov/resources/guides/hydropower/hydro-guide.pdf.
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sometimes substantial fee is viewed by many as both elitist and contrary to a sort of
pioneering tradition. APR could charge an access fee on its deeded lands but
chooses not to for both philosophical and public relations reasons.151 But they do
plan to experiment with an auction for the right to shoot bison, something they can
do because the private bison are considered livestock under Montana law.152
Conservationist lessees of public grazing lands could not charge an access fee
without a fundamental shift in federal policies with respect to access to public
lands. With the passage of time and a significant shift in public attitudes, however,
the idea of conservationists charging for access to wildlife they have effectively
provided at their own expense may be accepted. It would contribute to the costs of
wildlife habitat preservation and make the conservationists more competitive in the
marketplace. Although potential revenues from fees for other services like
campground sites will provide marginal revenues at best, they will be readily
accepted by most people already accustomed to paying such fees on public sites.
The final change APR has demonstrated to be effective is property taxes
and payments in lieu of taxes. The federal government is exempt from state and
local property taxes on the lands it owns.153 So too are lessees of those lands,
although grazing lessees pay property taxes on the value of their deeded ranch
which is significantly affected by the associated public land grazing allotments.154
APR pays taxes on all its deeded lands as assessed by each of the six counties, as
well as a state livestock per capita fee of $6.38 on each of its bison.155 The per
capita fee for cattle is $2.29 a head156 suggesting, not surprisingly, that the
cattlemen invest more in lobbying than the bison ranchers. As a non-profit, APR
could be exempt on up to 80 acres of any property devoted to education, but they
choose to forego the exemption. APR also pays the same BLM grazing fee as do
cattle ranchers. Because APR is controversial, to say the least, in the counties in
which it holds lands, paying its fair share of taxes is critical to building local public
support. For the sake of public relations and in recognition of their reliance on local
government services, conservation lessees of federal public lands should consider
making payments in lieu of taxes, just as the federal government does, derived
from the grazing fees paid by ranchers. Most counties with extensive public lands
have a substantially reduced tax base making the financing of local government
difficult.
VII. CONCLUSION
Federal public lands now designated for grazing constitute over 10 percent
of all land in the United States and a much higher percentage of undeveloped and

151. Geddes, supra note 14.
152. Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-1-101 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-101(6) (2009).
153. U.S. CONST. art. VI.; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (1819),
affirmed by Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
154. Neil R. Rimbey et al., Why Grazing Permits Have Economic Value, 32.1 J. AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. 20, 30 (2007).
155. Livestock Per Capita Fees, MONT. OFFICIAL ST. WEBSITE, http://liv.mt.gov/CentralizedServices/Per-Capita-Fees (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
156. Id.
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sparsely populated lands. Most of these lands provide good wildlife habitat and
could provide much more. This unexploited potential can be realized with the few
policy changes suggested above. Although the American Prairie Reserve has been
able to accomplish much within the existing regulations because of the fortuitous
classification of bison as livestock, it illustrates how much more could be achieved
if federal public grasslands were open to environmental and conservation uses in a
competitive market.
Under the existing law and regulations, the BLM and Forest Service lease
lands to private users for the limited purpose of grazing livestock. But decisions
about which lands to lease and how many cattle or sheep to permit on a given
allotment are made within the multiple-use management mandate that applies to
both agencies. While the policy of multiple-use management reflects a recognition
that the public has different and competing interests in how the land will be used, it
creates a significant procedural challenge for public lands agencies. They must
institute a process for determining what uses will be allowed, on which lands, and
by whom. Under the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act and subsequent public
lands planning legislation, the agencies have relied on a mix of public input and
resource management expertise. Public input is largely in the form of special
interest pleas, often couched as scientific claims, for more of their preferred use.
Because there is nothing in the concept of multiple-use, and little in other public
lands management laws, that mandates a particular mix of uses or allows public
lands managers to know when they have the mix right, resource allocation
decisions are often followed by litigation. Although the litigants always know what
substantive results they want, the litigation is usually over the process, in part
because both litigants and courts are faced with the same vague management
guidelines as the agencies.
Recurrent public land law review commissions, each asked to consider
whether and to what extent federal public lands should be privatized, have
concluded that the vast majority of public lands should remain in public ownership.
But at the same time, a long history of private access to public land resources has
made clear that public title does not necessarily imply or require public
management. The demands for privatization of federal public lands or their transfer
to state governments will continue, but those believing that markets offer a better
way of allocating many public lands resources will better spend their energies on
reforms that allow markets to function within the context of public ownership. As
Montana rancher Dan Fulton observed many years ago,157 those who depend on the
public grasslands for their livestock have far greater interest in the security of
tenure of sufficient duration to recoup investment than in title to the land. Ranchers
have had reasonably secure tenure in their grazing leases for many years. They
have also had an advantage in relation to those who, with similar security of tenure,
would willingly pay to make designated grazing lands more available for
conservation and wildlife.
The idea of allowing environmental organizations to acquire and retire
grazing leases on public lands has been around for a long time. Such a mixed

157. See generally DAN FULTON, FAILURE ON THE PLAINS: A RANCHER’S VIEW OF THE PUBLIC
LANDS PROBLEM (1982).
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model of public title and private management requires a level of public-private
cooperation that is generally absent in today’s partisan and contentious political
climate. But the growing success of the American Prairie Reserve with the
cooperation of the BLM, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks demonstrates that the possibilities for
wildlife habitat preservation and restoration are both real and substantial.

